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In this study, the influence degree and effect of support on innovation
incentives for research and development (R&D) personnel in micro and
small enterprises (MSEs) were explored based on the CMES data. We
found that government support will increase the R&D wage and widen the
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Introduction

T

he world is undergoing accelerating changes unseen in a century. The treacherous global
economic situation aggravates instability and uncertainty, and the drivers brought about by
the last round of the industrial revolution are gradually fading. It is thus imperative for us to foster new
drivers and stimulate endogenous growth. Innovation is a key link in driving sustainable economic
growth, as well as a strategic underpinning for high-quality development and a new journey of
building a modern socialist country. According to the CPC Central Committee's proposals for
formulating the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) for National Economic and Social Development and
the Long-Range Objectives Through the Year 2035, which was adopted at the Fifth Plenary Session
of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, China has a large number of MSEs,
which are an important driver in China’s socioeconomic development. As the development of MSEs
is inseparable from the drivers of innovation, the further promotion of innovative development can
highlight the competitive edge of micro-enterprises, serve as an important driver for the sustainable
growth of the macro-economy, and further respond to crises caused by the external environment
such as COVID-19 (Schumpeter, 1934; Krugman, 1979; Lin, 2002; Yang, 2020). Under the new
normal of the present, sluggish economy, China’s traditional competitive edge continues to weaken
as its economic growth has been driven by innovation instead of expanding growth factors and
investments. Thus, technological innovation, which can raise productivity, enhance product quality,
and promote technological progress, has become the core engine of China’s economic development (Li
& Zheng, 2016; Kong et al., 2017; He & Zhang, 2018). Because of the high risk, long cycle, externality,
and spillover effects of technological innovation (Arrow, 1962), the Chinese government has launched
various supportive policies, among which fiscal innovation support are one of the most important
supportive policies. According to the reports on the final accounts of the Ministry of Finance of the
People’s Republic of China, from 2012 to 2021, the national public budget expenditure on science
and technology reached RMB7.1 trillion, an average yearly increase of over 7 percent; in 2020, the
national financial expenditure on science and technology reached RMB1,009.5 billion. Therefore,
whether the innovation support policy can improve the quality and efficiency of technological
innovations, promote industrial transformations and upgrading, and achieve notable economic results
is crucial to the sustainable, healthy development of China’s economy.
As a part of “the initiative of mass entrepreneurship and innovation,” MSEs are an indispensable
force for China’s socioeconomic development, but at the same time, many of the MSEs face serious
challenges, including weak financial strength and low market influence (Huang, 2018). In particular, the
outbreak of COVID-19 has caused a huge negative impact on socioeconomic development, and a large
number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been left with operating difficulties (Li et
al., 2020). Financial support for MSEs is a common tool used by governments worldwide (Robinson,
1969), which is mainly achieved by upgrading the technological level of enterprises for higher
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productivity (Yuan & Zhu, 2020). For example, the United States heavily invests financial support
for small business start-ups, research and development, and commercialization (Li & Wang, 2022);
South Korea adopts a risk-sharing government support on corporate R&D investment (Lee & Cin,
2010); France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK focus on supporting R&D patents (Stefan et al., 2018).
China has also launched relevant fiscal support policies to encourage innovation in MSMEs. Studies
have found that fiscal support can compensate for some innovation externality risks of firms (Zhu
et al., 2010) and significantly increase the innovation investment of MSMEs (Huang, 2018). Support
will help alleviate the innovative pressures on MSEs. With more disposable capital, the enterprises
will be more capable of business expansions and increased investments in innovation while resisting
risks. Therefore, it is of great practical and policy significance to investigate the implementation effect
of fiscal support policy from the micro perspective of MSEs innovation, to give full play to support
for guiding enterprise innovations, to promote industrial optimization and upgrading, to adopt an
innovation-driven strategy and to build an innovative country.
At present, the research on China’s fiscal support policy mainly comes from two perspectives.
The first perspective is to analyze the selectivity and objective of support policies, and it is found
that government support tend to favor state-owned enterprises, public services, and high-tech
enterprises (Shao & Bao, 2011; Bu & Yu, 2012; Kong et al., 2013), because these enterprises
facilitate the government in achieving its social goals (Tang & Luo, 2007). However, a small
number of support are presently motivated by the earnings of listed companies (Tang & Luo,
2007; Chen et al., 2008). The second perspective is to focus on the implementation effects of a
support policy and explore whether the support policy has an incentive effect or an inhibitory
effect. Liu (2016) argued that there is a significant positive correlation between fiscal support and
corporate investments, but support, in turn, restrict corporate financing and research investments
to some extent. Yang et al. (2015), from the perspective of ownership and production elements
market distortions, found that government support have a positive effect on the innovation
performance of private enterprises. Zhang et al. (2015), on the other hand, believed that innovation
support, especially gratuitous support, have no significant effect on the R&D of SMEs. According
to Huang et al. (2018), support increase innovation investments in MSEs, but rent-seeking makes
the positive incentive effect smaller than that of tax incentives. According to Chen et al. (2022),
innovation incentives generated by government support for small enterprises are significantly
stronger than those for large enterprises. Clearly, most of the literature focuses on the effects of
support on R&D input, investments, and financing, while relatively little attention is paid to the
effects of labor. The existing limited studies analyze the effect of support on executives’ wages
based on the managerial power hypothesis (Luo et al., 2014; Bu et al., 2014; Tong, 2017). In the
era of a knowledge economy, human capital is the core capital of a country and an enterprise,
and technological innovation is inseparable from human capital (Yang & Li, 2004), and R&D
personnel are the carrier of human capital and the main body of technological innovation in
enterprises. The findings of An & Pi (2019) show that the best support scheme is to raise the price
18
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of dedicated human capital for original innovation. Nevertheless, listed companies do not disclose
the remuneration of R&D personnel, causing little literature available to analyze government
innovation support from the perspective of R&D personnel’s innovation incentives.
As a result, we used the China Micro and Small Enterprise Survey(CMES) data to examine
the influence degree and effect of support on innovation incentives of R&D personnel in MSEs.
Existing research indicates that innovation support for MSEs will widen the wage gap between
researchers and staff. This expanding wage gap is reflected in the fact that the average R&D
wage increases while the average staff wage remains unchanged. This effect is more prominent
in small, non-high-tech enterprises with strict financing constraints. Additionally, support cause
an increase in managerial innovation in MSEs by widening the gap between R&D wage and staff
wage, and this increase mainly comes from the wage premium of R&D personnel. However, this
mechanism is inapplicable to technological innovation. The above results suggest that support
increase the innovation incentives of R&D personnel in MSEs, but the effect of innovation
incentives only plays a role in managerial innovation and not in technological innovation, which is
what is needed for the construction of an innovative country.
The contribution of this study lies in the following three aspects:
First, unlike the existing literature that focuses on the effects of support on R&D inputs,
financing, and investments, our study investigated the effects of innovation support on the wage
gap of R&D personnel from the perspective of dedicated human capital, thus deepening the
research on the implementation effects of support policies.
Second, based on the unique data of the CMES questionnaire, we not only explored the policy
effects of innovation support in MSEs but also further examined the mechanism of innovation
support in MSEs. The results strongly indicate that innovation incentives for R&D personnel are
the core of innovation support in MSEs, which explains the innovation issues in MSEs in a more
comprehensive way and broadens the scope of firm size for subsequent studies.
Third, taking China’s goal of creating an innovative country as the research context, we
attempted to distinguish the effects of support on technological innovation and managerial
innovation behaviors of MSEs, which is of significant reference for understanding the
government-industry interactions in the implementation of support policies in China.
The following structure is arranged as follows: the second section renders the research
hypotheses, the third section presents the data and variable descriptions, the fourth and fifth
sections report the empirical results, and the final section contains our research conclusions.

Research Hypotheses
Influence Degree of Support on Innovation Incentives of R&D Personnel
Wage is the result of initial social distribution, and government support is a part of social
19
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redistribution. Empirically, the gap between R&D wage and staff wage was used to measure the
innovation incentives of R&D personnel. Based on the existing literature, the wage gap is influenced
by various factors, including company characteristics and internal governance, but also the external
macroeconomic environment and government wage control policies (Lin et al., 2003; Fang &
Li, 2015). In China, most of the studies on support and the wage gap have been explained by the
management power theory, which argues that support enable executives to increase their pay by
“faking” corporate performance targets for personal gains (Luo 2014; Bu & Wang, 2014; Tong &
Chen, 2017). Although the wage gap has received widespread attention, the domestic literature has
not yet focused on the R&D personnel’s wage gap; in knowledge-intensive production, human capital
is as important as physical and financial assets in the innovation process, and varied employment
relationships provide different incentives for employees to develop human capital and technological
innovation (Filippo, 2012). Therefore, in this study, the determinants and mechanisms of the R&D
personnel wage gap in MSEs were explored based on the CMES data, which specifically inquired
about the wage of professional and technical personnel.
In the institutional context of the economic transition, when Chinese enterprises face huge
capital needs for talent building and technological upgrading, fiscal support help ease the burden
caused by the rising cost of raw materials and employee wages, which leaves more space for
industrial transformations and upgrading. The supported enterprises will have more money to
invest in equipment upgrading, talent building, and other projects closely related to technological
innovation. For MSEs, the financial support from support is crucial due to their poor economic
strength and ability to resist risks. Consequently, how to ensure that the money is well spent has
become a pressing issue. CMES data shows that in 2014 and 2015, 16.7 percent of MSEs closed
down each year. Unlike large and medium-sized enterprises, which have sufficient latency
for technology introductions and equipment investments, MSEs should invest more money in
introducing professional and technical talents, which is the most effective way to address the
existing survival dilemma. Therefore, we proposed the following hypothesis:
H1: Support increase the R&D wage in MSEs, widening the wage gap with staff.
Effects of Support on Innovation Incentives of R&D Personnel
There are two opposing theoretical perspectives on the motivational effects of the wage gap.
The tournament theory believes that widening the internal wage gap can enhance the performance
of the whole enterprise (Edward, 1981; Sherwin, 1986), while the behavioral theory argues that
an excessive wage gap will reduce employees’ enthusiasm which will have a negative effect on
enterprise performance (Siegel & Hambrick, 1996). At present, the vast majority of the Chinese
literature on the economic consequences of the wage gap supports the tournament theory. Liu
and Sun (2010) Li and Hu (2012) analyzed the influence degree of the wage gap on enterprise
performance in different regions using state-owned assets data, and this incentive shows
heterogeneity. Based on the data of listed enterprises, Liang et al. (2019) found that the market
20
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value of an enterprise increases as the internal wage gap widens, and the incentive elasticity
differs for enterprises in varied life stages.
However, only a few domestic scholars have studied the linkage between the wage gap and
innovation behavior based on micro firms. Kong et al. (2017) found that the wage gap has an
incentive effect on enterprises’ innovation behavior, and this incentive effect is mainly at the
strategic level. He and Zhang (2018), on the other hand, held that the rise of labor costs plays
a higher role in substantive innovation than strategic innovation, while the wage gap, in turn,
promotes innovation to a certain extent. At present, academic discussions on the wage gap and
innovation do not make a strict distinction between large and medium-sized enterprises and
MSEs. Some studies take listed companies or private enterprises as research objects, and other
studies also have deficiencies in their samples, such as small regions, small sizes, and limited
industries. As a result, the further focus of this study is to explore the effect of innovation
incentives on R&D personnel’s wage gap in MSEs as well as the innovation outputs.
There is a huge natural difference in size between MSEs and large and medium-sized
enterprises, which leads to MSEs’ poor ability to resist innovation risks. Coupled with their
disadvantages in capital, technology, and achievement transformation, MSEs’ innovation
motivation is severely inhibited. Consequently, MSEs often choose development projects with
little investment but quick results. As a result, compared with traditional technological innovation
in terms of new products, technologies, and processes, supporting R&D personnel through wage
incentives bring more management innovation with respect to service, marketing, organizational
system, and culture. Therefore, we proposed the following hypothesis:
H2: Through the widened wage gap, support increase managerial innovation in MSEs, not
technological innovation

Data and Variables
Samples
In this study, the data sources are from the CMES, a field survey of MSEs’ legal entities
published by the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS). To obtain the overall unbiased
estimation of MSEs and keep samples representative, the CHFS adopts a strict stratified random
sampling, which fully considers the industry, enterprise, and regional differences. The survey
sample includes 5,601 Chinese MSEs. The main survey contents involve MSEs’ information
on production and operation, human resource management, R&D and innovation, financing,
finance, taxation, organization and management, and operating environments in 2014. Due to
the limitation of the questionnaire, CMES only inquired about innovation support for enterprises
in manufacturing, software and information technology services, information transmission, and
electricity, heat, gas, and water production and supply industries, so the proposed research objects
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are limited to the above four industries. To ensure data validity and eliminate the influence of
abnormal samples, all continuous variable samples were winsorized at the 0.5 percent level.
Finally, 442 observations were selected after removing the missing values.
Definitions of Variables
Support.
In the CMES data, 18.78 percent of MSEs received innovation support in 2014, of which the
average support amount for supported MSEs was RMB235,900. Based on the work of Huang
(2018), we used the natural logarithm of corporate innovation support as the main variable, which
was set to zero if there was no support.
Wage gap.
In enterprises, R&D personnel often hold key resources and core capabilities and directly
undertake pioneering tasks in innovation activities. For this reason, it is crucial for enterprises to
motivate the R&D personnel and stimulate their innovation desires and abilities. There are many
innovation incentives for R&D personnel. The common ones include income incentives and
stock option incentives (Yang & Li, 2004). Limited by the fact that CMES only investigated the
wage incentives of professional and technical personnel and did not investigate the related data
of stock option incentives, this study refers to the research of Kong et al. (2017) and defines the
ratio between the average professional and technical staff wage and the average staff wage as the
gap between R&D wage and staff wage. Among them, the average staff wage is the average wage
of regular employees in the survey questionnaire. If the enterprise has no regular employees, the
average wage of non-regular employees will be used instead.
Innovation.
Innovation refers to the incentive of R&D personnel to achieve the enterprise’s desired
innovation goals and to enhance the innovation capability, which is best expressed by the
innovation output (Zhou et al., 2012). CMES data classify innovation output into technological
innovation and management innovation. In the traditional sense, innovation outputs regarding
new products, technologies, and processes belong to technological innovation, while innovation
outputs regarding services, marketing, organizational systems, and culture fall within
management innovation. Based on the existing empirical literature (Li & Zheng, 2016; Kong et
al., 2017; He & Zhang, 2018) that studies the innovation behavior of listed enterprises, this study
will explore the effect of innovation incentives for R&D personnel in MSEs from perspectives
of both technological and management innovation. This is because, for MSEs, technological
innovation is to promote the enterprises’ technological progress to obtain a competitive edge,
whereas management innovation is simple, formal, and less sustainable.
Other control variables.
Based on the research model of Huang (2018), this study controls not only for the personal
characteristics of MSEs’ major owners: age, education, work experience, or entrepreneurial experience,
22
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but also for the enterprise characteristics: total asset size, operating revenue, asset-liability ratio,
industry type, and trade association relationship. The CMES data only collects bank loans and
private borrowings of MSEs, so the two were summed in this study and used as the total liabilities
to calculate the asset-liability ratio. Due to the limited sample and the incorporation of industry
dummy variables in this study, the per capita GDP of each province was used in this study to
control for regional differences.
Descriptive Statistics
According to Table 1, the mean difference between the R&D wage and staff wage in MSEs
was 1.75 in 2014, where the average monthly R&D wage was RMB5,646.27, and the staff wage
was RMB3,366.22. R&D wage is thus significantly higher than staff wage. For innovation
output, 86 percent of MSEs have technology innovation outputs, and 30 percent of MSEs have
management innovation outputs, which is consistent with the current context of “the initiative of
mass entrepreneurship and innovation” in China.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variables

rdoutput1

Meaning
Logarithm of government
support
Wage gap, i.e., the ratio of
R&D wage to staff wage
R&D wage, i.e., the
average monthly wage of
professional and technical
staff (yuan)
staff wage, i.e., the average
monthly staff wage (yuan)
Technological innovation

442

0.86

0.35

0

1

rdoutput2

management innovation

442

0.30

0.46

0

1

age

Age of the principal owner
Years of education of the
principal owner (number of
years)
Work or entrepreneurship
experience
Industry associations

442

44.25

9.78

24

70

442

13.11

3.19

6

22

442

0.88

0.33

0

1

442

0.49

0.50

0

1

Logarithm of total assets
Logarithm of operating
revenue
The asset-liability ratio is
the ratio of total bank loans
and private loans to total
assets
Logarithm of GDP per
capita by province
Manufacturing industry

442

15.67

1.89

6.91

19.52

442

15.76

1.78

9.90

19.30

442

0.13

0.29

0

2

442

10.95

0.40

10.18

11.56

442

0.88

0.33

0

1

support
Gap
rdwage
staff wage

edu
exp
institute
lnassets
lnrevenue
lev
lngdp
ind1

Sample Size

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

442

1.77

4.19

0

14.51

442

1.75

2.31

1

25

442

5646.27

6955.50

1600

75000

442

3366.22

1189.78

1200

9000
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Variables
ind2
ind3

Meaning
Software and information
technology services
industry
Information transmission
industry

Sample Size

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

442

0.08

0.27

0

1

442

0.03

0.18

0

1

Study on the Influence Degree of Support on the Innovation Incentives of R&D
Personnel in MSEs
Baseline Regression Model
In order to investigate the influence degree of innovation incentives for R&D personnel in
MSEs, this study takes the gap between R&D wage and staff wage, the average R&D wage
and the average staff wage, respectively, as explained variables, with the purpose of examining
whether innovation support widen the wage gap of MSEs and improves the wage incentives of
R&D personnel as well as staff, as shown in Model (1). Due to the left broken-tailed distribution
of the wage data, the Tobit model was used for estimation in this study.
Gap(Wage) = β 0 + α1support
subsidy + Χβ + u , Gap = max(1, Gap), Wage = max(0, Wage) (1)

where, the dependent variable Gap denotes the gap between R&D wage and staff wage,
and Wage denotes the remuneration. The independent variable support denotes the amount of
government innovation support, and X is a control variable, specifically the characteristic variable
for enterprise owners and enterprise characteristic variables, as shown in Table 1. In addition,
we controlled for industry and added the GDP per capita variable for each province to control for
regional heterogeneity.
Table 2 reports the regression results of Model (1). The coefficient support is positive in
Column 1 and significant at the 1 percent level, which indicates that the innovation support can
widen the gap between R&D wage and staff wage in MSEs. Specifically, the coefficient support
in Column 2 is significantly positive and the coefficient support in Column 3 is not significant,
which indicates that the main reason for the widened wage gap is that support increase R&D
wage but have no effect on staff wage. This finding is consistent with the optimal support scheme
proposed by An et al. (2009): Enterprises raise the price of dedicated human capital for original
innovation through support, which will maximize the positive effect of support.
The coefficients control variables indicate that those MSEs that joined their industry
association have a significantly higher wage gap than those MSEs that did not join their industry
association. The younger and more educated the MSEs’ major owner, the larger the MSEs, the
higher the operating revenue, the lower the leverage, and the larger the gap between R&D wage
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and staff wage. In addition, the major owner’s work experience has a negative correlation with the
wage gap, and all of the above are consistent with intuitions.
Table 2 Effect of Support on Wage Gap
Gap

Variables

R&D Wage

(1)

Staff Wage

(2)

0.0668***
[0.0077]

[27.3803]

[6.6691]

age

-0.0197***

-54.65***

-3.22

[0.0015]

[6.8607]

[4.9900]

edu

0.0545***

165.7***

4.215

[0.0069]

[11.5009]

[25.6483]

exp

-1.155***

-2887.5***

69.10***

[0.0583]

[301.2475]

[18.7792]

0.0990*

52.9

-175.4

[0.0558]

[47.0719]

[131.8180]

0.171***

251.1***

-27.05***

[0.0165]

[26.2689]

[8.6654]

0.0584***

255.2***

112.9***

[0.0177]

[40.6344]

[28.6178]

-0.0345

-766.2***

-280.8***

[0.0328]

[70.5769]

[24.3130]

-0.300***

732.2**

785.6***

[0.0486]

[317.1268]

[100.9610]

institute
lnassets
lnrevenue
lev
lngdp

166.1***

(3)

support

-6.773

Industry dummy variables

Yes

Yes

Yes

Constant term

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observed value

442

442

442

Pseudo R2

0.0201

0.0031

0.0133

Note: This table reports the effect of support on the wage gap in MSEs. Pseudo R2 is the fit of the Tobit model; the
numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of robustness to clustering heteroskedasticity at the industry level, *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The same hereinafter.

Robustness Test
To ensure the robustness of the results, this study calculated the weighted average of staff wage
by the number of regular employees and non-regular employees and examined its effect on the wage
gap in MSEs. The findings show that the coefficient support is significantly positive at the 1 percent
level, which is consistent with the benchmark results, as shown in Column 1 of Table 3.
Endogeneity Test: Instrumental Variables
The benchmark regression results of support to the gap between R&D wage and staff wage
may be disturbed by endogeneity. On the one hand, the year 2014 was taken as the time range
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in the CMES survey, so there may be endogeneity caused by reverse causality between them.
However, the gap between R&D wage and staff wage in 2014 affects the support in future years,
so reverse causality does not exist. On the other hand, although this study controls for enterprise
owners and enterprise characteristics, provinces, and industries, there are limited questions in
the questionnaire, and other key explanatory variables may be missing. For instance, the inflow
of R&D talents or other talents may lead to a false causality between support and the wage gap.
Therefore, in this study, instrumental variable regression was used to alleviate the endogeneity
from missing variables.
Referring to the approach of Huang (2018), this study constructed instrumental variables with
support other than innovation and used the Ivtobit model for estimation. Any type of support is to
alleviate the financing constraints of enterprises through financial support, and support are related
to the government’s administrative efficiency. Local governments that provide enterprises with
adequate innovation support also help enterprises in other areas, so innovation support are correlated
with support of other types. Additionally, support of other types do not directly affect R&D wages,
so they are exogenous. Column 2 of Table 3 shows that support is significantly positive, which is
consistent with the benchmark regression results and verifies the robustness of the results.
Table 3 Robustness and Endogeneity Tests of Support and Wage Gap
Variables
support

Robustness test

Endogeneity test

(1)

(2)

0.0596***

0.524***

[0.0076]

[0.0113]

Control variable

Yes

Yes

Industry dummy variables

Yes

Yes

Constant term

Yes

Yes

Observed value

442

442

Pseudo R2

0.0188

Wald test

4168.68

p value

0.0000

Note: The Wald exogeneity test (alpha=0) is used to test for endogeneity; the results of control variables are omitted due
to space limitations. The same hereinafter.

Heterogeneity Analysis
According to the Regulations on the Criteria for the Classification of SMEs, small and microenterprises are distinguished by their operating revenue and the number of employees. By
analyzing the regression results of the empirical models in columns 1 and 2 in Table 4, we found
that: Innovation support have a more prominent effect on the wage gap for small enterprises than
for micro-enterprises. This suggests that due to innate resource disadvantages, such as industry
barriers, excessive competition, and financial repression, as well as high corporate transaction
26
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costs resulting from excessive government interventions in the micro-economy and the prevailing
official rent-seeking activities, MSEs are unable to obtain reasonable innovation support, where
the problem of micro-enterprises is more prominent (Zhang et al., 2015). According to CMES data,
in four industries, 7.43 percent of micro enterprises received innovation support, with an average
support of RMB69,700; 24.49 percent of micro-enterprises received innovation support, with an
average support of RMB261,300. It is evident that the breadth and depth of micro-enterprises
benefiting from innovation support are insufficient.
High and New-Technology Enterprise (HNTE) refer to resident enterprises that have been
registered in the mainland for over one year, continuously carried out R&D and transformation
of technological outcomes within the high and new technology fields supported by the State,
formed the core independent intellectual property rights and conducted business activities on
this basis. High-tech enterprises enjoy preferential tax incentives, such as additional deductions
for R&D expenditures, accelerated depreciation of fixed assets, and a preferential income tax
rate of 15 percent. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 show the estimations after grouping by high-tech
enterprises. The coefficient of innovation support was significantly positive, and that of hightech enterprises was smaller than that of non-high-tech enterprises. This suggests that support
received by non-high-tech enterprises have a more significant effect on the wage gap due to the
crowding-out effect of tax incentives on support (Liu, 2016; Lin et al., 2013; Lu et al., 2014; Huang
& Deng, 2012). This study also groups enterprises by their median asset-liability ratio to verify
the funding constraint mechanism of support in a more direct manner. According to the results in
columns 5 and 6 of Table 4, support have a positive effect on the R&D wage gap for high-leverage
enterprises. For low-leverage enterprises, support have a negative and insignificant effect. This
indicates that support widen the wage gap of MSEs by alleviating the financing constraints. This
conclusion also demonstrates that the government provides financial support for MSEs through
support to help overcome various uncertainties and enable MSEs to have sufficient conditions for
innovation (Lin, 2002).
Table 4 Heterogeneity Analysis
Variables
support

Micro
Enterprises
(1)

Small
Enterprises
(2)

High-tech
Enterprises
(3)

Non-high-tech
Enterprises
(4)

High-Leverage
Enterprises
(5)

Low-leverage
Enterprises
(6)

0.0405***

0.0689***

0.0667***

0.0787***

0.130***

-0.0154

[0.0079]

[0.0060]

[0.0031]

[0.0104]

[0.0003]

[0.0095]

Control variable Yes
Industry dummy
Yes
variables
Constant term
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observed value

148

294

258

184

178

264

Pseudo R2

0.0282

0.0177

0.0213

0.0196

0.0202

0.0360

Note: Due to space limitations, the results of the control variables are omitted. The same hereinafter.
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Effect of Support on the Innovation Incentives of R&D Personnel in MSEs
Mediating Effect: Wage Gap and Innovation
At present, innovation is a decisive factor in driving China’s sustainable economic growth. As
a public good, there are significant externalities in the outcomes of innovation activities, and the
resulting insufficient innovation may hinder China’s economic growth. To correct market failures,
the Chinese government has generally adopted financial innovation support and encouraged
“the initiative of mass entrepreneurship and innovation.” For further analysis of the effects of the
innovation support policy, the Probit model was used in this study to empirically explore the effect
of the gap between R&D wage and staff wage on the innovation outcomes of MSEs. Based on the
research of Huang and Deng (2012), the following model was set:
Innovation = β 0 + αGap + Χβ + µ

(2)

Innovation = β 0 + α1Gap + α 2support
subsidy + Χβ + µ

(3)

where, the dependent variable Innovation denotes innovation outcomes, and based on CMES
data characteristics, innovation outcomes include technological innovation regarding new
products, technologies, or processes, as well as management innovation regarding organizational
culture and marketing service approaches. The independent variable Gap denotes the gap between
R&D wage and staff wage. The remaining variables are the same as Model (1) and will not be
repeated.
Table 5 shows the results of the mediating effect. Combined with the mediating effect test
procedure of Wen et al. (2004), this study finds that the wage gap does not have a mediating
effect between support and technological innovation (the coefficient Gap in Column 1 is not
significant). There is a partial mediating effect between support and managerial innovation
(the coefficients Gap and support in Columns 3 and 4 are both significantly positive at the
1 percent level, and the marginal effect of Gap becomes smaller due to the introduction of
the coefficient support). Therefore, innovation support improve the enterprises’ managerial
innovation outcomes by widening the gap between R&D wage and staff wage in MSEs.
There are two reasons that only affect management innovation. On the one hand, due to the
difficulty of technological innovation, MSEs are limited by their own resource endowments,
such as company size, financing constraints, and industry barriers (Lin et al., 2009); on the
other hand, Chinese enterprises prefer to pursue strategic management innovation with the
quick result, thus neglecting substantive technological innovation (Yang, 2020; Li & Zheng,
2016; Kong et al., 2017).

28

│当代社会科学│2 0 2 2年第5 期│

Table 5 Mediating Effect: Wage Gap and Innovation
Variables
Gap
support
Control variable
Industry dummy
variables
Constant term
Observed value
Pseudo R2

Technological Innovation
(1)
(2)
0.000553
0.000391
[0.0009]
[0.0009]
0.00153*
[0.0009]
Yes
Yes

Non-technological Innovation
(3)
(4)
0.00764***
0.00539***
[0.0004]
[0.0005]
0.0146***
[0.0024]
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
442
0.0643

Yes
442
0.0646

Yes
442
0.0665

Yes
442
0.0827

Note: The table shows the marginal effects of the variables. Due to space limitations, the results of the control variables
are omitted. The same hereinafter.

Decomposition Effect: Wage Premium
In this part, potential mechanisms of the gap between R&D wage and staff wage in MSEs
affecting innovation were explored. To identify the source of innovation incentive caused by the
wage gap, this study separates the innovation effect of R&D wage and staff wage. The wage
comparison exists not only within the same enterprise but also between different enterprises in
the same industry. Based on the research of Kong et al. (2017), this study decomposes the gap
between R&D wage and staff wage according to the following equations:
Gap =

rdp =

rdwage - premium
rdp
* Industry - wage - gap =
* IWG
staffwage - premium
staffp

rdwage
Industry - median - of - rdwage

staffp =

IWG =

staffwage
Industry - median - of - staffwage

Industry - median - of - rdwage
Industry - median - of - staffwage

(4)

(5)
(6)
(7)

where, rdp denotes R&D wage premium, or the ratio of average R&D wage to its industry
median, which reflects the wage comparison between R&D personnel from different enterprises
in the same industry; staffp denotes staff wage premium or the ratio of average staff wage to its
industry median, which reflects the wage comparison between staff from different enterprises in
the same industry; IWG denotes industry wage gap or the ratio of the industry median of average
R&D wage to the industry median of the corresponding average staff wage.
Therefore, Model (1) is extended as:
Innovation = β 0 + α1rdp + α 2 staffp + α 3 IWG + Χβ + µ

(8)
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The statistical results are shown in Table 6. In line with the results of Model (2), the wage
gap of MSEs only plays a role in management innovation, and the marginal effect of R&D wage
premium is 0.0149***, indicating that R&D wage incentives produce a positive marginal effect on
management innovation regarding organizational culture and marketing service approach, a result
consistent with He and Zhang (2018). Furthermore, the coefficient staff wage premium is positive
and not significant, which indicates that staff wage premium has no significant effect on innovation.
The comparison of the two variables indicates that R&D wage premium is the main driver of
management innovation in MSEs, and this finding supports the tournament theory of wage gap.
Table 6 Decomposition Effect: Wage Gap and Innovation
Technological Innovation

Variables
rdp

Non-technological Innovation

(1)

(2)

0.00262

0.0149***

[0.0028]

[0.0021]

0.0291

0.0192

[0.0437]

[0.0482]

-0.580***

-2.886***

[0.0600]

[0.0414]

Control variable

Yes

Yes

Industry dummy variables

Yes

Yes

Constant term

Yes

Yes

Observed value

442

442

Pseudo R2

0.0653

0.0669

staffp
IWG

Note: The table shows the marginal effects of the variables. Due to space limitations, the results of the control variables
are omitted.

Conclusions
As a major engine of national economic growth, MSEs play a key role in growth stabilization,
employment increases, innovation promotion, market prosperity, social harmony maintenance, and
satisfaction of residents’ needs. Based on the industry-wide CMES field survey data, the research
results of the effect of fiscal support on corporate innovation through R&D wage incentives, which
uses the macro-control measure of fiscal and taxation supports, are summarized as follows: First,
support significantly increase the MSEs’ R&D wage and widen their gap with staff wage, indicating
that support influence innovation in MSEs through dedicated human capital inputs. Second, further
analysis of enterprise groupings reveals that compared to micro enterprises (high-tech enterprises and
low-leverage enterprises), the gap between R&D wage and staff wage increases significantly when
small enterprises (non-high-tech enterprises and high-leverage enterprises) are encouraged by support.
R&D wage and wage gap increase significantly for small enterprises (non-high-tech, high-leverage
enterprises) when they are supported relative to micro firms (high-tech, low-leverage enterprises).
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This indicates that while support policy affects innovation incentives of R&D personnel, the scale
effect, tax preference crowding out effect, and financing constraint effect are also in play. Third,
support stimulate innovation more as management innovation rather than technological innovation.
For the supported enterprises, management innovation, rather than technological innovation,
increases during the year, and the support of management innovation derive from the R&D wage
premium. This shows that although support motivate R&D personnel to innovate, R&D personnel
choose management innovation that is short-cycle, low-risk, low-cost, with quick results, and reject
technological innovation that can truly improve the market value of MSEs.
Based on the above conclusions, we propose the following policy recommendations.
First, improving the support disbursement and evaluation mechanism and promoting the
innovative technology voucher system. Given the urgent need for government support for
MSEs, it is recommended to expand the scope of support disbursements, strengthen the support
disbursements, and improve the process of support disbursements so that more MSEs who
aspire to innovation may enjoy the benefits of the policy. In recent years, the innovation voucher
system for SMEs has been a direct response to the lack of innovation resources and insufficient
innovation motivation in SMEs. Through the issuance of innovative technology vouchers,
enterprises are linked with research institutions and universities to form an organic combination
of industry, university, and research, which is a beneficial exploration for China to reform the way
of financial investments in science and technology from a market-oriented direction.
Second, strengthening the building of human capital. Rational enterprises will establish a
mechanism of cultivation, use, evaluation, and incentives for R&D personnel, so that the R&D
personnel may benefit from sharing the corresponding value of human capital and releasing the
dividend of population quality. This not only stimulates the initiative, enthusiasm, and creativity
of R&D personnel but also forms an innovation thrust for the effective demand scale of enterprise
innovation. As a result, a virtuous cycle between employee wage and enterprises’ innovation
vitality can be formed, thus facilitating the high-quality development of enterprises. Additionally,
exogenous government interventions will also provide more innovation incentives.
Third, implementing differentiated policies. It is necessary to implement differentiated support
policies and refine innovative behaviors in terms of difficulty, depth, and potential value. For
high-tech R&D projects, the competent departments may combine with preferential tax policies
to increase support and promote technological innovation of enterprises. For enterprises of varied
sizes, different incentive goals should be clarified on whether to improve economic profitability,
expand corporate investments or address difficult corporate financing, and start from specific,
clear goals to address corporate difficulties.
Fourth, creating a good market environment. Relevant departments should accelerate the
marketization process, formulate strict property rights protection policies as well as relevant
laws and regulations, improve the efficiency of capital market investments, and provide a fair
and free competition environment to alleviate restrictions on private enterprises and MSMEs,
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protect their innovation activities, and give convenient conditions to their R&D investments.
Moreover, relevant departments should guide vulnerable enterprises to implement scientific and
technological innovation, improve the quality of innovation, facilitate technological progress, and
realize industrial transformations and upgrading.
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